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Abstract: This research investigates the role of  corporate governance as a moderator between firms’
performance and their Training and Development Policy (TDP). Research data were taken from the US,
Brazil, Russia, India, China and Indonesia from 2007 to 2013. This research found that the TDP is
important for enhancing firm performance. Also, the role of  the training and development policy im-
pacted each firm’s performance differently, according to the level of  corporate governance of  that firm.
The moderating effect of  corporate governance reveals that better governance of  a firm may have an
influence on its TDP policy, which would lead to better firm performance. Overall, the results are consis-
tent with the conjecture that corporate governance influences the firm’s performance and training and
development policy, suggesting that the training and development policy’s success depends on the corpo-
rate governance level of  the firm. Hence, this research contributes to two big theories: the knowledge
transfer theory and the human capital theory, where the research findings show a confirmation of  the two
theories application in this research context.
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Introduction
An industry report by the International
Labour Organization ILO (2006) indicated
that organizations in the United States spent
a total of  $55.8 billion on their Training and
Development Policies (hereafter TDP). The
net direct training expenditure averaged
USD458 per employee and 1.3 percent of the
total gross wages and salaries. This number
had increased substantially with the com-
pounded growth rate being around 5 percent
in 2010, since 1996. Although training is only
one way for employee learning to occur, the
investment made in training requires an analy-
sis of the evidence to examine if training pays
off  in organizational effectiveness. However,
there is skepticism about the link between
training and the results criteria. Training is
often criticised for being faddish, too expen-
sive, not transferring to the job, and not im-
proving the bottom line (Bowers 2017;
Caudron 2002; Kraiger et al. 2004; Wright
and Geroy 2001).
However, several scholars argued that
the knowledge and skills of  an organization’s
workforce are significantly important to firm
performance, competitiveness, and innova-
tion (Dukhan et al. 2017; Madarisa et al.
2017). According to Kraiger (2003), success-
ful organizations are thought to invest more
in training and development than other orga-
nizations, where these training and develop-
ment programmes will lead to improvements
in the organizational performance and results
(Dolezalek 2005; Salas and Cannon-Bowers
2001).
Further, the TDP performance topics
focus only on the costs and benefits of TDP
to firm performance without taking into con-
sideration the corporate governance factors.
It is important to examine TDP through the
agency cost perspective by taking corporate
governance as an important factor. Studies
done by de Kok et al. (2003), Bunch (2007),
and Deng et al. (2012) emphasised that the
success of any training and development
would depend on the governance of  the firm.
In other words, the ownership concentration,
firm’s size, and board structure play impor-
tant roles in determining the success of  the
TDP, which is in line with the alignment theo-
rem. Moreover, most of the research con-
ducted in this area only evaluates TDP using
reaction criteria (Alliger et al. 1997; Kraiger
2003; Kraiger et al. 2004), and surveys
(Nguyen et al. 2011; Ganotakis 2012). Hence
this research aims to bridge the research gap
in this area.
Nevertheless, the research into the ef-
fects of  training on performance remains de-
batable, especially at the organizational level
of analysis (Tharenou et al. 2007). Prior re-
searchers such as Hsu and Wang (2010)
Subramanian and Youndt (2005) found that
human resources have an impact on organi-
zational performance, as the core of  an orga-
nization. Thus, it is pertinent for an organi-
zation to ensure that all the key success fac-
tors of  TDP must not be taken lightly. This
study aims to investigate the association be-
tween TDP and firm performance by using
samples taken from the US and the leading
emerging countries such as Brazil, Russia,
India, China, and Indonesia from 2007 to
2013. This study further investigates the re-
lationship by introducing corporate gover-
nance into the estimation model as a mod-
erator, to examine whether the performance
of  TDP would depend on the firms’ good
corporate governance.
For robustness reasons, this study takes
six countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China,
Indonesia, and the US) as its sampling frame.
There are three reasons to justify this choice
of  countries. First, much research focuses on
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the developed market context. Adding the
leading emerging economies such Brazil, Rus-
sia, India, China, and Indonesia may result in
a better insight into this research area. To
make it more robust, this research added one
developed economy, the US, into this research
for a better comparison. Second, this research
aims to compare the effect of TDP on cor-
porate performance in two different econo-
mies of scale. Brazil, Russia, India, China,
and Indonesia are the leading developing
economies, with a steady pace of capitaliza-
tion of  their stock markets. The GDP and
HDI improvements may give different per-
spectives on the TDP-performance links. Yet,
the US, as the representative of  the devel-
oped markets, might have a different insight
on these TDP-performance links. Comparing
the results from those countries enriches the
generalization of  this research. Lastly, each
country may have different corporate gover-
nance and unique institutional settings. As
corporate governance is the moderating vari-
able, adding these six countries may give a
better view of the role of governance on the
TDP-performance link.
In sum, this study aims to examine the
role of corporate governance on the relation-
ship between TDP and firms’ corporate per-
formance. This research uses two perfor-
mance measures: Tobin’s Q and the return
on assets. Furthermore, this research has ex-
tended the common research design in hu-
man resource to a new empirical context and
modified the model in terms of  some mea-
sures and definitions. It also followed previ-
ous, established studies by controlling for the
firms’ characteristics. This research focused
on two aspects namely: TDP and corporate
governance, and used secondary data for the
TDP and the corporate governance index
from Asset4, which are all explained in Sec-
tion 3. The knowledge theory is used as the
base for this research’s framework.
This study’s contribution is threefold.
First, this research enriched the literature by
extending the understanding of this research
area for the context of both developed coun-
tries and developing countries. Second, this
research documented the empirical findings
of training and developments’ effects on cor-
porate values in developed and developing
countries. Third, this study further established
the fact that corporate governance may play
a significant role in determining the perfor-
mance of  a firm in relation to its training and
development.
The research paper is organised accord-
ing to the following sequence. In the next
section, the related literature is briefly re-
viewed. Section 3 describes the data, sample
selection criteria, and preliminary analysis.
Section 4 shows the findings and discussions.
Section 5 presents the conclusion and impli-
cations of the research.
Literature review
Training can be defined as a systematic
process of providing employees with certain
competencies, such as knowledge, skills and
abilities, so that they would be able to carry
out their current jobs effectively and effi-
ciently (Lepak and Gowan 2010). As for the
term development, it refers to learning expe-
riences that focus more on the long term, for
preparing employees for responsibilities in
different jobs, usually at the management
level (Lepak and Gowan 2010). Both train-
ing and development performance are impor-
tant for organizations because it is impossible
for them to grow and compete in this current
highly competitive and globalised business
environment without them. However, train-
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ing and development is often viewed as a
waste of resources, and are implemented just
to comply with legal requirements.  Training
is also perceived by some organizations as a
fad without linking the training to measur-
able results (Tharenou et al. 2007; Caudron
2002; Kraiger et al. 2004).
Recent developments in the literature
of strategic management realised the impor-
tance of human capital/resources
(Kamukama and Sulait 2017; Jardon and
Dasilva 2017; Narwal and Yadav 2017;
Jardon and Martos 2009). Human capital that
possesses skilled and knowledgeable employ-
ees through an organization’s training and
development enables that organization to
achieve a competitive advantage over its
competitors. Valuable, rare and inimitable
resources such as skills and knowledge are
considered as resources (Jardon and Dasilva
2017; Narwal and Yadav 2017; Tharenou et
al. 2007). Some researchers also equate an
organizational learning capability, which in
this study is manifested through the training
and development of the organization, as a
dynamic capability (Ambrosini et al. 2009;
Zahra et al. 2006). Dynamic capability can
be defined as the capabilities that are geared
towards the modification of operational ca-
pabilities, such as innovations to the
organization’s product or processing systems
(Zahra et al. 2006). Learning is an important
capability that can be a source of sustainable
competitive advantage. Investing in develop-
ing learning capabilities is crucial in the cur-
rent competitive environment.
This research uses two theories as the
base of  the research’s framework: the knowl-
edge transfer theory and human capital theory.
Knowledge transfer theory means the trans-
ferring of knowledge from one organization
to other. Using this theory, Hajidimitriou et
al. (2012) showed empirical evidence of how
well-trained employees would benefit their
organization through its knowledge diffusion.
Besides that, Deardorff and Djankov (2000)
in their study found that knowledge transfer
through subcontracting arrangements will in-
directly increase a firm’s performance when
the knowledge transfer theory is properly ap-
plied to the organization; it will increase the
human capital of the employees and enable
the organization to operate efficiently as the
human capital of  the organization increases.
The notion was further supported by Hsiao
et al (2017), Tsai (2001) who postulated that
when knowledge is being transferred effi-
ciently through an organization, it would be
a sustainable competitive advantage for that
firm.
Meanwhile, the human capital theory is
a theory derived from the classical econom-
ics stream. It shows that employees’ personal
incomes will be different, as they are based
on the amount of investment in the human
capital of  the employees. The investment in
employees’ human capital means the educa-
tional level as well as the training taken by
the employees. Marimuthu et al. (2009) stated
that human capital is the process of enhanc-
ing people by improving their educational
level and professionalism, in order to improve
their knowledge, skills, values and social as-
sets that may help in improving their
organization’s performance. This means that
when the level of knowledge and ability has
been upgraded, this may cause the organiza-
tion to perform better. Furthermore, Ketchen
et al. (2017) and Lepak and Snell (1999) de-
fined human capital as the main component
for increasing a business venture’s assets and
workforce, to increase its efficiency and com-
petitive advantage.
According to Parham and Heling
(2015), an employee or worker with human
capital will be able to provide a firm with
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important information during the decision-
making process and investment in the strate-
gic assets. Ahmad et al. (2016) also agreed
that the human capital theory means a higher
educational level is needed to increase the
capability of people, as different levels of
education and skills can influence the level
of  wages. Vomberg et al. (2015) mentioned
that there is a positive relationship between
human capital and the firm value. This means
that when the human capital of the worker
or employee is high, the performance of  the
organization will be better and more efficient.
How training may improve firm perfor-
mance is debatable. From the perspective of
the knowledge theory and resource based
view, trained employees should benefit the
organization. For instance, Khan et al (2011)
showed that training and development have
significant effects on organizational perfor-
mance in Pakistan. They used 100 different
samples and revealed that TDP is an impor-
tant factor for an organization to deliver its
vision, mission, and goals and enhance its
employees’ abilities. Amstrong (2000) argued
that TDP is very necessary for an organiza-
tion, and it must be designed with the needs
of the employees in mind. Those organiza-
tions which develop a good training design,
in accordance with the needs of their employ-
ees as well as the organization, always get
good results (Boudreau 2006). It seems that
the design of the proposed training plays a
very vital role in both the employees’ and the
organization’s performance. Badly designed
training is nothing but a waste of time and
money (Tsaur and Lin 2004).
Methods
Firm Performance
Firm performance is calculated by two
measurements, namely, the Return on Assets
(ROA), and Tobin’s Q. In calculating the
ROA, this research uses Earnings before In-
terest, Taxes, and Depreciation (EBITDA)
instead of  net income as the numerator. The
reason is that some industries might have a
relative advantage or disadvantage from de-
preciation and amortization which may lead
to biased results. Meanwhile, the denomina-
tor of  ROA is the book value of  assets. The
formula is as follows:
AssetsTotal
EBITDA
ROA
This research uses Tobin’s Q because it
is relatively better at capturing the effective-
ness of  management (Westerfield et al, 2005).
Tobin’s Q is the market value of  total assets
divided by their replacement costs, which can
be written as follows:
Costplacement
AssetsTotalofMV
QsTobin
Re
' 
Control Variables
Prior research showed there are four
factors that could affect a firm’s performance,
namely, the firm’s size, profitability, growth
opportunities, and leverage (Black et al, 2006;
Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; Masulis et al.
2012). The basic model is stated as below.
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Value= f(Size, Growth Opportunities, Prof-
itability, Leverage)
In measuring a firm’s size, this research
uses the log of  total assets (LTA). Meanwhile,
other control variables were developed by fol-
lowing previous research into corporate gov-
ernance (Black et al. 2006; Bhagat and Bolton
2008; Masulis et al. 2012), where the growth
opportunities ratio is capital expenditure di-
vided by sales (CES). The profitability is
taken from the ratio of operating income –
sales ratio (OIS), and ratio of debt to com-
mon share equity measures leverage (LEV).
Hence, the empirical regression model is
shown as Equation 1.
Value=  + 
1
LTA
i,t
 + 
2
LEV
i,t
 +

3
CES
i,t
 + 
4
LEV
i,t
 + 
i,t
 ........(1)
Training and Development
Policy (TDP)
This study uses Asset4 data to retrieve
the Training and Development Policy (TDP).
The category is a binary dummy variable,
which equals 1 for firms which apply a train-
ing and development policy.
Value=  + 
1
LTA
i,t
 + 
2
LEV
i,t
 +

3
CES
i,t
 + 
4
LEV
i,t
 + 
5
TRAIN
i,t
+ 
i,t
 .....................................(1)
Corporate Governance
As the objective of this study is to in-
vestigate the role of corporate governance
(represented by GOV in the following for-
mulae) in explaining the performance of  a
training and development policy, this study
employed the corporate governance score to
represent the level of corporate governance
of  a firm. The score is calculated from four
important dimensions, which are the board’s
structure, function, compenzation policy, and
shareholder rights. Furthermore, it measures
a firm’s systems and processes, which ensure
that its board members and executive act in
the best interest of  its long term sharehold-
ers through its best management practices.
Note that the higher the corporate governance
score is, the better a firm performs its corpo-
rate governance. The data is retrieve from the
Asset4 database.
Firstly, this research investigates the role
of  corporate governance on the firms’ per-
formance. The model is as Equation 3.
Value=  + 
1
LTA
i,t
 + 
2
OIS
i,t
 +

3
CES
i,t
 + 
4
LEV
i,t
 +

5
GOV
i,t
 + 
i,t
 ...................... (3)
Then, it proceeds to the investigation
of the moderating role of corporate gover-
nance on the relationship between TDP and
firm performance. The model is as equation
4.
Value=  + 
1
LTA
i,t
 + 
2
OIS
i,t
 +

3
CES
i,t
 + 
4
LEV
i,t
 +

5
TRAIN*GOV
i,t
+ 
i,t
 .................................... (4)
Data
This research retrieved data from the
Worldscope and Asset4 databases to collect
panel sets of annual financial data for Brazil,
Russia, India, China, Indonesia, and the US
from 2007 to 2013. This initial sample cov-
ers thousands of  publicly listed firms. It then
filters the listed firms and eliminates firms
without complete data to make the balanced
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panel data set. Firms with missing data
throughout the six year period were excluded
too. At the end, the final data covered around
2,436 firms derived from the 6 countries.
The dummy variable is the measurement
of  TDP, where 1 is for a firm which imple-
mented TDP and 0 otherwise. In fact, the
database provides the TDP in Yes-No codes
to classify and distinguish the firms with
TDP and without TDP. Meanwhile, corpo-
rate governance’s score is obtained from As-
set4, it is calculated based on the 4 main cor-
porate governance functions listed earlier.
The higher the score, the better the corpo-
rate governance is.
This research runs the models by pool-
ing the data set country by country. This re-
search does not combine it all, or control for
the country effect, for two reasons. First, each
country has different institutional settings.
Pooling the data and adding the country vari-
able as controls causes estimation bias. Sec-
ond, this research aims to compare the role
of  TDP on firm performance in each coun-
try.
The estimation model is run under a
panel regression for each country. The panel
data approach allows for assessing changes
in the training and development policy and
corporate governance over time, albeit not
any significant changes in both the levels over
time, and thus produces more reliable esti-
mates (see Baltagi 2008). Panel regression
controls the correlation between the cross-
sectional error term and the predictor vari-
ables. It also allows the effect of  those time-
invariant characteristics to be removed, so it
will give a best prediction compared to a
cross-sectional analysis or time series analy-
sis (Petersen 2009).
Next, this research ran the full set of
diagnostic tests for the panel data following
Arrelano and Bond (1991) and Pedroni
(2008). It starts with the Wald test for indi-
vidual effects, the Breusch Pagan LM test for
random effects, the Hausman test for fixed
effects, and a full set of dynamic settings of
for the panel regression (from AR(1), AR(2),
Sargan test, and Hansen test). Indeed, the
Classical Linear Regression Model (CLRM )
procedure was estimated preceding those pro-
cesses. The diagnostic tests show that the
model proposed in this research falls into a
fixed effect panel regression. Based on  the
result of AR(1), AR(2), Sargan test, and
Hansen test, it does not have endogeneity,
even in lag 1. A two-way fixed effect panel
Table 1. Descriptive Statistic Results
  US Brazil Russia India China Indonesia 
LTA (1) 
1.4227  0.6249  1.0670  0.3892  1.2377  0.4366  
(6.9845)  (0.4280)  (5.4479)  (0.9571)  (6.1464)  (0.3766)  
OIS (2) 
0.1343  0.1188  0.1142  0.0259  0.1142  0.0990  
(0.1339) (0.1494) (0.1515) (0.5063) (0.1152) (0.1285) 
CES (3) 
0.1571  0.1272 0.1273  0.1217  0.1430  0.1575  
(0.3214) (0.1687)  (0.2635) (0.2418) (0.2957) (0.1552) 
LEV (4) 
0.0285  1.0294  0.0239  2.3580  0.0314  1.1323  
(0.4834)  (2.9599) (0.4012) (2.3852) (0.5801) (3.5519)  
TOBIN'S Q (5) 
0.2335  0.2919  0.2569  0.3269  0.3036 0.2802  
(0.4689) (0.1449) (0.1470) (2.3136) (0.5627)  (0.1246) 
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  US Brazil Russia India China Indonesia 
ROA (6) 
0.1982  0.2378  0.2220  0.2180  0.2676  0.2478  
(0.3571) (0.2152) (0.2632 ) (0.8518) (0.3352) (1.0078) 
Satterthwaite–Welch's t-test 
(1)-(2) 
0.0804  0.5949*** 0.8740*** 0.231** 0.7100* 0.4176*** 
(0.7890) (0.0010) (0.0000)  (0.0230) (0.0620) (0.0061) 
(1)-(3) 
0.8857*** 0.3844** 0.2986** 0.0716  1.2261*** 1.2977*** 
(0.0000)  (0.0150) (0.0380) (0.5080) 0.0000  0.0000  
(1)-(4) 
0.0769** 0.0275 ** 0.1578 *** 0.1407 ** 0.0693 ** 0.0477 ** 
(0.0110) (0.0450) (0.0080) (0.0103) (0.0135) (0.0358) 
(1)-(5) 
0.0334 ** 0.0590  0.0265 * 0.0737 * 0.0501 ** 0.0208 * 
(0.0429) (0.1660) (0.0686) (0.0940) (0.0253) (0.0575) 
(1)-(6) 
1.0579  0.7686 * 1.3286 * 0.2894 * (2.3865) (2.0972) 
(0.0545) * (0.0776) (0.0738) (0.0592) (0.2380) (0.2994) 
(2)-(3) 
2.4254 *** (4.6514) 6.2868 ** 0.2044 ** 3.1969 * 5.7192 *** 
(0.0030) (0.4240) (0.0160) (0.0400) (0.0520) (0.0050) 
(2)-(4) 
0.0804  0.5949 *** 0.8740 *** 0.2311 ** 0.7100 * 0.4176 *** 
(0.7890) (0.0010) (0.0000)  (0.0230) (0.0620) (0.0061) 
(2)-(5) 
0.9034*** 0.3959 ** 0.3105*** 0.0737 1.2874*** 1.3496*** 
(0.0002)  (0.0225)  (0.0002) (0.5080)  (0.0030)  (0.0000)  
(2)-(6) 
0.0723 ** 0.0267 ** 0.1468*** 0.1351 ** 0.0658 ** 0.0448*** 
(0.0220) (0.0285) (0.0050) (0.0104) (0.0194) (0.0000) 
(3)-(4) 
0.0354 ** 0.0608 * 0.0270 * 0.0789 * 0.0521 ** 0.0218 ** 
(0.0429) (0.0575) (0.0904) (0.0528) (0.0400) (0.0133) 
(3)-(5) 
1.0674 0.7747 * 1.3406 * 0.2923 * 2.6252*** 2.2650*** 
(0.1012) (0.0520) (0.0821) (0.0738) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
(3)-(6) 
1.0516 0.7486 * 1.3073*** 0.2790 * 2.2767 1.9798 ** 
(0.1301) (0.0766) (0.0000) (0.0776) (0.4230) (0.0150) 
(4)-(5) 
2.6437*** 5.0235 6.7269 ** 0.2228 3.4527 6.1195 ** 
(0.0000) (0.3392) (0.0400) (0.1664) (0.2664) (0.0381) 
(4)-(6) 
  
2.4375*** 4.6793*** 6.3308 ** 0.2060 3.2257 6.2911*** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0170) (0.2380) (0.2994) (0.0070) 
 
Table 1. Continued
Note: that for the descriptive statistic, figures are mean value, and figures in the parenthesis are standard deviation; SW
t test refers to Satterthwaite–Welch’s t test and the figures in the parenthesis under SW t test are p-values. *, **, and
*** denotes statistical significant at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively.
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regression is employed to make the model
more robust.
Results and Discussion
Descriptive Results
Table 1 describes the summary of  sta-
tistic for this research’s sample of  2,346 firms
across the six countries (US, Brazil, Russia,
India, China, and Indonesia) and seven peri-
ods (2007-2013). The mean values were cal-
culated for each variable to facilitate com-
parison among the variables. These mean
values are provided, including their standard
deviation values, which are depicted in pa-
renthesis. This research also provides the sta-
tistical test for the difference in the mean
value for each variable across the six vari-
ables. As expected, firms in the US have the
best financial ratios among all six countries.
Then comes Russia. This reveals that devel-
oped countries such the US and Russia (mem-
bers of the D-8) have relatively better per-
formance as compared to those emerging
markets such as Brazil, India, China, and In-
donesia.
Even though the panel data does not
strongly pre-requisite normality, it reports low
values for the standard deviation and good
values for the mean, which implies that there
is no such type-1 error in this data. Further-
more, the t-test indicates that there are sig-
nificant differences among the variables,
meaning each value of each variable has a
different indicator. This illustrates that each
financial ratio has a different financial mea-
sure. This is also important as it differenti-
ates the performance measures between
Tobin’s Q and ROA. The findings in Table 1
imply that there is no such cross-measure
from each variable (multicollinearity) and also
there is no such autocorrelation.
Baseline Results
Table 2 presents the panel regression
results for the baseline model (Model 1). With
short panel data (the number of  firms is sig-
nificantly larger than the number of years), it
reports the probability values based on White
robust standard errors that control for
heteroscedasticity errors, as well as firm clus-
tering, year clustering, and the period effect
which will induce the within-firm serial cor-
relation error structure. Basically the coeffi-
cient estimated for all the variables is consis-
tent in sign and magnitude across the various
specifications, except for the significance
level of several control variables in certain
countries, due to country characteristics (e.g.
developed vs developing or labor-intensive
vs technology-intensive). This research starts
with the US, which is the largest and most
developed market in this sample. As ex-
pected, all the four control variables basically
contribute positively to the firms’ perfor-
mance and they are statistically significant
except for the size (LTA). Meanwhile, the
adjusted R2 of the model is 24.43 percent
(Tobin’s Q model) and 23.84 percent (ROA
model) which is the largest compared to the
other markets. The baseline model estimation
for US shows there is no different conclusion
between Tobin’s Q model and the ROA
model. It then continues to Brazil’s results
where the adjusted R2 is good enough, 19.75
percent for Tobin’s Q model and 18.22 per-
cent for the ROA model. The control vari-
ables of Brazil were slightly different from
the US results. Only profitability (OIS) and
leverage (LEV) contributed significantly to
Brazilian firms’ performance.
The results of the baseline model for
Russia were considerably different. The ad-
justed R2 values are still good enough, at
14.70 percent for Tobin’s Q and 14.38 per-
cent for ROA. However, only one control
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variable contributed significantly to the firms’
performance, which is profitability. The rest,
such as size, leverage, and growth, failed to
influence the performance of  the listed firms
in Russia. In the Indian context, the adjusted
R2 also indicates the model is good enough
in terms of  the predictors’ variance. The val-
ues are 16.61 percent and 18.26 percent for
Tobin’s Q model and the ROA model, respec-
tively. The control variables contribute posi-
tively to the performance. However, similar
to the US model’s results, it is only size that
does not influence the performance signifi-
cantly. Profitability, growth, and leverage are
statistically significant at the 5 percent level
for the firms’ performance. This is the same
conclusion with China and Indonesia. In
China’s context, all the control variables ex-
cept size contributed significantly to the
firms’ performance. It is noteworthy that
those models are good enough where the ad-
justed R2s are 20.19 percent and 17.83 per-
cent for the Tobin’s Q and ROA respectively.
In the Indonesian context, where the adjusted
R2s are also good enough (17.11% for
Tobin’s Q and 16.93 for ROA), profitability,
growth, and leverage have also influenced the
performance of  the firms significantly, at the
5 percent level. Size, on other hand, fails to
have a statistically significant role in the
firms’ performance. The baseline model re-
sults are consistent with previous research,
such as that by Black et al (2006) and Masulis
et al (2012)
Table 2. Estimates of  Baseline Model
  US Brazil 
 Tobin's Q ROA Tobin's Q ROA 
INTERCEPT 
2.1489*** 1.9552*** 1.7234*** 1.9562*** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0020) 
LTA 
0.0316 0.0023 0.0201 0.0111 
(0.8190) (0.9828) (0.3941) (0.5457) 
OIS 
0.0453*** 0.0438** 0.0675*** 0.0610*** 
(0.0008) (0.0122) (0.0000) (0.0002) 
CES 
0.9317*** 0.9046** 0.1990 0.1872 
(0.0018) (0.0207) (0.8434) (0.7905) 
LEV 
0.5226*** 0.5194*** 0.3808*** 0.4626*** 
(0.0000) (0.0020) (0.0096) (0.0070) 
Adj R2 0.2443 0.2384 0.1975 0.1822 
 Rusia  India 
INTERCEPT 
1.0193*** 1.0207*** 1.2262*** 1.4048*** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
LTA 
0.0492 0.0440 0.0248 0.0323 
(0.6303) (0.6182) (0.2461) (0.8832) 
OIS 
0.0206*** 0.0201*** 0.0294*** 0.0207** 
(0.0001) (0.0020) (0.0026) (0.0404) 
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The Role of Training and
Development
This research further estimated Model
(2) to examine the role of  the Training and
Development Policy (TDP) on the firms’ per-
formance. Table 3 contains the model’s re-
sults for the performance of  TDP from the
six countries. Those estimations with two dif-
ferent performance measurements have the
estimation of R2, which range from 12 per-
cent to 28 percent.
The estimation of Model (2) shows that
both Tobin’s Q and ROA are positively re-
lated to TDP. In the context of  the US, this
research finds the TDP contributed positively
to the firms’ performance. The coefficient
values are 0.5527 and 0.4278 for Tobin’s Q
and ROA, respectively. TDP is also statisti-
cally significant for the firms’ performance.
This means imposing TDP might help firms
in the US to improve their performance, not
only based on their accounting performance,
such as ROA, but also their market-based
performance, such as Tobin’s Q. It arrived at
the same conclusion for the Brazilian con-
text. TDP contributed positively and signifi-
cantly to the performance of  Brazilian firms.
The coefficient values are 0.5314 and 0.4919
for Tobin’s Q and ROA. Again, this indicates
  US Brazil 
 Tobin's Q ROA Tobin's Q ROA 
CES 
0.1136 0.1184 0.6858*** 0.6313* 
(0.8467) (0.6171) (0.0002) (0.0781) 
LEV 
0.1271 0.1367 0.3019** 0.4991*** 
(0.2533) (0.1125) (0.0323) (0.0000) 
Adj R2 0.1470 0.1438 0.1661 0.1826 
 China Indonesia 
INTERCEPT 
1.3449*** 1.0430*** 1.3272*** 1.4320*** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0020) 
LTA 
0.0401 0.0202 0.0329 0.0330 
(0.6841) (0.2315) (0.8294) (0.4105) 
OIS 
0.0430*** 0.0372** 0.0575** 0.0508** 
(0.0025) (0.0160) (0.0121) (0.0246) 
CES 
0.5745*** 0.5085** 0.4479** 0.4327* 
(0.0053) (0.0276) (0.0464) (0.0711) 
LEV 
0.4227** 0.3356*** 0.3690*** 0.3090* 
(0.0172) (0.0035) (0.0017) (0.0642) 
Adj R2 0.2019 0.1783 0.1711 0.1693 
 
The regression is performed using two different measures of  performance: Tobin’s Q and ROA. The figure stated are
the coefficient values, except numbers in parentheses which are p-value. The dependent variable is firm performance. The
control variables are relative size (RLTA), relative profitability (ROIS), relative growth (RCES), and relative leverage
(RLEV). The model is as follow: tititititi LEVCESOISLTAValue ,,4,3,2,1  
Table 2. Continued
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that TDP might improve the firms’ perfor-
mance in Brazil.
This research then looked at the other
countries such as Russia, India, China, and
Indonesia. The conclusion remains the same;
TDP has played an important role in firm
performance. In Russia, TDP has a good
magnitude of  influence on the firms’ perfor-
mance where the coefficients estimated are
0.4497 and 0.4250 for the Tobin’s Q model
and ROA model, respectively. However,
firms in India are not significantly associated
with TDP. This is the same conclusion with
firms in China. Lastly, firms in Indonesia
show the TDP’s contribution to the firms’
performance is statistically significant, with
coefficient values of 0.4026 and 0.4840 for
Tobin’s Q model and the ROA model, respec-
tively.
Interestingly, the coefficients estimated
for the control variables changed their sig-
nificant role in performance after TDP was
introduced into the model, except in the con-
text of  the US. This research finds that the
estimated coefficients of  size, profitability,
growth, and leverage has lost its contribution
in association with firm performance. For
instance, the leverage does not play a signifi-
cant role on firm performance in Brazil in the
research sample. Only profitability has a sig-
nificant contribution to both Tobin’s Q and
ROA. This is also the same for Indonesia. The
growth and leverage have lost their signifi-
cant contribution to firm performance, so
only profitability plays an important role in
Indonesian firms’ performance. Interesting
findings are found in the context of Russia,
India, and China. All the control variables that
once made significant contributions to firm
performance have turned out to not be sig-
nificant when TDP was introduced in the
model. For example Russia, where the
baseline model’s results show a significant
contribution by profitability. Yet, Table 3 re-
ports profitability is not a significant predic-
tor of  firm performance in Russia when TDP
is introduced. The same conclusion goes for
India and China. Profitability, growth, and
leverage contributed significantly to firm per-
formance in those 2 countries. However, af-
ter TDP was introduced, there was no con-
trol variable that had a significant influence
on firm performance. In the context of  the
US, the role of  control variables towards firm
performance is a stronghold where all the
control variables contribute positively and
significantly to firm performance, except for
size.
Note that this research finds another
interesting result. The coefficients estimated
for size and growth in all the countries ex-
cept for the US have changed their sign; which
is inconsistent with the baseline model. The
coefficients of  LTA (size) and CES (growth)
change from positive to negative. This means
that TDP may positively contributed to per-
formance, however, the economy of  scale
such as size, profitability, growth, and lever-
age have new conclusion.
Overall, the findings supported the hy-
potheses in this research. The results indicated
that there is a significant role for TDP in the
firms’ performance. This shows that if  a good
TDP is imposed, the firm will perform much
better. This means the findings are consistent
with previous research, such as that by Storey
(2002), Storey (2004), and Kwon and Rupp
(2013), who all found the significant role of
training and development on firm perfor-
mance. However, after introducing the TDP
into the model, the control variables produced
different results. All the countries except for
the US have lost the role of the control vari-
ables. Moreover, some countries experienced
changes in the coefficients’ signs from posi-
tive to negative for the firms’ performance.
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It is possible, however, that these changes are
caused by the cost of  the TDP, or good cor-
porate governance. Therefore, the research
was extended to explore the role of corpo-
rate governance in this matter.
The Role of Corporate
Governance
The regression results for the role of
corporate governance (GOV) in each of  the
six countries using Model (3) estimations are
reported in Table 4. For the US firms, this
research finds a corporate governance role of
0.3054 on the firms’ Tobin’s Q score and
0.2851 for their ROA. This role is statisti-
cally significant at the 5 percent level. This
means the result is in line with the literature
addressing the role of corporate governance
on better firm performance in the context of
the US (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Brown
and Caylor 2006; Bhagat and Bolton 2008).
  US Brazil 
 Tobin's Q ROA Tobin's Q ROA 
INTERCEPT 
 -2.1666***  -1.9798*** 1.6336*** 1.0161***  
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
RLTA 
-0.0465 -0.0159 0.0430  -0.0170 
(0.7469) (0.8884) (0.4751)  (0.4151) 
ROIS 
0.0456*** 0.0441** 0.0409*** 0.0354**  
(0.0008) (0.0236) (0.0000) (0.0193) 
RCES 
 0.9272***  0.9024** 0.0036  0.0456  
(0.0015) (0.0199) (0.5142) (0.5155) 
RLEV 
 0.5188***  0.5165*** -0.0246 -0.0666 
0.0000  (0.0021) (0.1227) (0.1682) 
TRAIN 
0.5527*** 0.4278*** 0.5314** 0.4919*  
(0.0000) 0.0079  (0.0362)  (0.0555)  
Adj R2 0.2811  0.2809  0.2282  0.1893  
 Russia India 
INTERCEPT 
0.9953***  0.8785***  1.0851***  1.0620***  
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0020) (0.0000) 
RLTA 
0.0339  0.0363  -0.0420 -0.0108 
(0.4660) (0.4684) (0.3901) (0.4213) 
ROIS 
0.0121  0.0197  0.0282  0.0127  
(0.1214) (0.1263) (0.1681) (0.1654) 
RCES 
0.0053  0.0076  0.0233  0.0395  
(0.4918) (0.4938) (0.1070) (0.1169) 
RLEV 
-0.0263 -0.0286 -0.0443 0.0605  
(0.3272)  (0.2471) (0.3786) (0.1481) 
TRAIN 
0.4497***  0.4250***  0.2666  0.3040  
(0.0000) (0.0042)  (0.1064)  (0.1152)  
Adj R2 0.1634  0.1658  0.1881  0.1920  
Table 3. Estimates of  Training and Development Policy and Firm Performance
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Table 3. Continued
The regression is performed using two different measures of  performance: Tobin’s Q and ROA. The figure stated are
the coefficient values, except numbers in parentheses which are p-value. The dependent variable is firm performance. The
control variables are relative size (RLTA), relative profitability (ROIS), relative growth (RCES), and relative leverage
(RLEV). The main independent variables are Training and Development Policy. The model is as follow:
titititititi TRAINLEVCESOISLTAValue ,,,5,4,3,2,1  
Table 4. Estimates of  Corporate Governance and Firm Performance
 US Brazil 
 Tobin's Q ROA Tobin's Q ROA 
INTERCEPT 
0.9081 1.9398*** 0.7723*** 0.7735*** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
LTA 
0.1967 0.0273 0.1357 0.0037 
(0.2713) (0.3613) (0.2223) (0.2135) 
OIS 
0.0365*** 0.0437*** 0.0624*** 0.0281*** 
(0.0030) (0.0014) (0.0032) (0.0089) 
CES 
0.7701*** 0.8792*** 0.5524* 0.4326* 
(0.0003) (0.0020) (0.0664) (0.0530) 
LEV 
0.6872*** 0.5132*** 0.5296** 0.4827** 
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0201) (0.0102) 
GOV 
0.3054*** 0.2851*** 0.4866*** 0.4400*** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0005) (0.0000) 
Adj R2 0.2737 0.2204 0.1931 0.1845 
 Tobin's Q ROA Tobin's Q ROA 
 China Indonesia 
INTERCEPT 
1.2478***  1.0106***  1.7356***  1.8095***  
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
RLTA 
-0.0480 -0.0186 0.0345  -0.0287 
(0.3841) (0.4135) (0.4666) (0.4034) 
ROIS 
0.0274  0.0143  0.0291**  0.0310*  
(0.1224) (0.1811) (0.0470) (0.0846) 
RCES 
0.0194  0.0472  0.0058  0.0574  
(0.1221) (0.1337) (0.1268) (0.1248) 
RLEV 
-0.0404 0.0682  -0.0268 0.0784  
(0.1471) (0.1017) (0.1429) (0.1327) 
TRAIN 
0.3140  0.3048  0.4026**  0.4840**  
(0.1261)  (0.1567)  (0.0275)  (0.0146)  
Adj R2 0.2446  0.2277  0.1957  0.1936  
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 Tobin's Q ROA Tobin's Q ROA 
 Russia India 
INTERCEPT 
0.7509*** 0.7306*** 0.8702*** 1.0026*** 
(0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
LTA 
0.1220 0.0091 0.1493 0.0122 
(0.2061) (0.2225) (0.2555) (0.2156) 
OIS 
0.0571*** 0.0326*** 0.0513*** 0.0281*** 
(0.0001) (0.0008) (0.0057) (0.0075) 
CES 
0.6964 0.4078 0.6391*** 0.4372* 
(0.3984) (0.2313) (0.0035) (0.0575) 
LEV 
0.1427 0.2050 0.5485*** 0.3068*** 
(0.1102) (0.1940) (0.0022) (0.0099) 
GOV 
0.4648*** 0.4760*** 0.3146*** 0.2323*** 
(0.0010) (0.0001) (0.0068) (0.0000) 
Adj R2 0.1711 0.1691 0.1751 0.2001 
 China Indonesia 
INTERCEPT 
1.0504*** 0.9873*** 0.8687*** 1.0855*** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0019) (0.0000) 
LTA 
0.1330 0.1149 0.1240 0.0139 
(0.2714) (0.2907) (0.1218) (0.1878) 
OIS 
0.0466* 0.0436** 0.0502** 0.0395** 
(0.0552) (0.0188) (0.0294) (0.0338) 
CES 
0.6744*** 0.3750** 0.5810** 0.3667** 
(0.0002) (0.0215) (0.0189) (0.0116) 
LEV 
0.5638** 0.2919** 0.4984** 0.2417** 
(0.0188) (0.0363) (0.0208) (0.0312) 
GOV 
0.3057** 0.4575*** 0.2793** 0.2463** 
(0.0114) (0.0000) (0.0225) (0.0278) 
Adj R2 0.2227 0.2160 0.1843 0.1837 
Table 4. Continued
The regression is performed using two different measures of  performance: Tobin’s Q and ROA. The figure stated are
the coefficient values, except numbers in parentheses which are p-value. The dependent variable is firm performance. The
control variables are relative size (RLTA), relative profitability (ROIS), relative growth (RCES), and relative leverage
(RLEV). The main independent variables are Corporate Governance. The model is as follow
titititititi GOVLEVCESOISLTAValue ,,,5,4,3,2,1  
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This research’s estimation also finds a signifi-
cant role by corporate governance in Brazil-
ian firms’ performance. Corporate governance
has contributed positively, with scores up to
0.4866 and 0.4400 for the Tobin’s Q and
ROA of  the firms in Brazil. This is consis-
tent with the previous works of Klapper and
Love (2004), da Silva and Leal (2005), and
Estrin and Prevezer (2011) who addressed
the important of corporate governance in in-
ducing firm performance in Brazil.
This research continued its investigation
into Russia, India, China and Indonesia.
Firms in Russia indicated a significant role
for corporate governance on firm perfor-
mance. The estimated coefficient values are
0.4648 for Tobin’s Q and 0.4760 for ROA.
This is in line with prior research in Russia,
such as that undertaken by Black (2001),
Klapper and Love (2004), Renders et al.
(2010) and Estrin and Prevezer (2011). In the
Indian context, it also found a significant con-
tribution by corporate governance on firm
performance, where the values are 0.3146 and
0.2323 for Tobin’s Q model and ROA model,
respectively. Jackling and Johl (2009), and
Balasubramanian et al. (2010), and Estrin and
Prevezer (2011) arrived at the same conclu-
sion with their research findings, in which they
addressed the importance of corporate gov-
ernance on Indian firms’ performance. The
positive and significant role of corporate gov-
ernance in firms’ performance is also found
in China. The listed firms in China showed a
correlation between corporate governance
and the firms’ performance, where the esti-
mated coefficient values are 0.3057 and
0.4575 for Tobin’s Q model and ROA model,
respectively. This is consistent with the pre-
vious results of Hu et al. (2010), Sami et al.
(2011), Estrin and Prevezer (2011), and
Masulis et al. (2012). Lastly, there is also a
positive and significant contribution by cor-
porate governance to firm performance in
Indonesia. The magnitude of this influence
is also strong, because the estimated coeffi-
cient values are 0.2793 for Tobin’s Q and
0.2463 for ROA. This is in line with the pre-
vious research of Mitton (2002), Klapper and
Love (2004), Ramdani and Wittenloostuijn
(2010), and Prabowo and Simpson (2011)
which concluded that there is a significant
relationship between corporate governance
and Indonesian firms’ performance.
For the control variable’s results, this
research finds that the estimated coefficient
of  LTA (size) is positive but not significant
to firm performance. The coefficient of  OIS
(profitability) is positive and significant. The
estimated coefficient values are 0.0365,
0.0624, 0.0571, 0.0513, 0.0466, and 0.0502
for the Tobin’s Q model in the US, Brazil,
Russia, India, China, and Indonesia, respec-
tively. This continues with the third control
variable, which is CES (growth). This re-
search finds that the growth of  the firms con-
tributes significantly only in the US, Brazil,
India, China and Indonesia. Growth has no
significant role in the performance of  Rus-
sian firms. Lastly, the estimated coefficient
for LEV (leverage) is significant and positive
for firms in the US, Brazil, India, China, and
Indonesia, but not in Russia. The estimated
coefficient values in Tobin’s Q model are
0.6872, 0.5296, 0.5485, 0.5638, and 0.4984
for the US, Brazil, India, China and Indone-
sia, respectively. Meanwhile, the estimated
coefficients of  leverage in the ROA model
are 0.5132, 0.4827, 0.2050, 0.3068, 0.2919,
and 0.2417 for the US, Brazil, India, China
and Indonesia, respectively.
75
Gadjah Mada International Journal of Business – January-April, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2018
The Moderating Effect of
Corporate Governance
Table 5 reports the estimates of  firm
performance with TDP, considering the cor-
porate governance of  the firms. In Model (1),
only the baseline model of  firm performance
is addressed. Then this research modifies it
into Model (2), where TDP is introduced, and
Model (3), where corporate governance is
introduced. Both models of  Tobin’s Q and
ROA conclude that the main predictors, ei-
ther TDP or corporate governance, of  firm
performance in the six-countries are statisti-
cally significant. However, a negative sign
and/or an insignificant role for the baseline
variables are found in certain countries. This
intriguing finding makes us want to investi-
gate the interaction between those two main
predictors further. This research then hypoth-
esized that there is a moderating role by cor-
porate governance on the relationship be-
tween TDP and firm performance. This re-
search believes that a firm with better corpo-
rate governance might have different results
for its TDP-firm performance association, as
compared to a firm with poor corporate gov-
ernance.
This research proceeded to add an in-
teraction term between TDP and corporate
governance to investigate whether the impact
of  TDP on firm performance differs across
different corporate governance levels. This
research also controls for the firms’ unobserv-
able characteristics, such as differences in
their managerial characteristics and corporate
cultures by adding a 2-way firm-period fixed
effect and reporting the results of Model (4)
in Table 5. Note that the adjusted R2 sur-
mises the model has a good goodness of fit.
The estimates of the baseline variables
are the same as the conclusion reported in
Table 2. This does not reflect any inconsis-
tencies with Model (1), Model (2), Model (3)
and Model (4) because with the added inter-
active terms, this coefficient now represents
different conclusions. It is measuring the ef-
fect of TDP for the different levels of cor-
porate governance of  the firms. The
significances of the estimates for TDP
(
5
TRAIN
i,t
) in Model (4) revealed that in the
performance of  those firms which have a
training and development policy. Moreover,
the significance of the estimates for corpo-
rate governance (
6
GOV
i,t
) in Model (4) also
reveals that for the performance of  firms
which have conducted corporate governance.
On the other hand, the interactive terms ex-
plain the moderating effect of the model.
After the interactive term is introduced,
the baseline variables have a consistent sign
and significance with Model (1). The size of
the firm is still not significant in associating
it with the firms’ performance. However, the
profitability has regained a significant role in
the firms’ performance. These remarks are
found in all the countries in our study. The
growth of  firms has also contributed posi-
tively and is statistically significant for the
firms’ performance in 4 countries, which are
the US, India, China, and Indonesia. This is
totally different to the findings from the esti-
mations of Model (2), where some countries
even suffered discounted performance in their
growth. Another positive and significant con-
tribution comes from profitability on the
firms’ performance in all the countries, ex-
cept Russia.
The results of  Table 5 also indicated the
same conclusion as the estimations of Model
(2) and Model (3), where TDP and corporate
governance contributed positively and signifi-
cantly. However, the significance did not oc-
cur in certain countries such as India and
China. The estimated coefficient values of
TDP (
5
TRAIN
i,t
) towards Tobins’s Q are
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0.4223, 0.3583, 0.4014 and 0.2299 in the
context of  the US, Brazil, Russia and Indo-
nesia, respectively. Meanwhile, the estimated
coefficient values of TDP (
5
TRAIN
i,t
) to-
wards ROA are 0.4259, 0.3827, 0.3979 and
0.2957 in the context of  US, Brazil, Russia
and Indonesia, respectively. Furthermore,
corporate governance reveals the same con-
clusion, thus, India and China have been in-
cluded as their firms have strong and signifi-
cant associations with corporate governance.
The estimated coefficient values of corpo-
rate governance () are 0.5308, 0.3389, 0.3391,
0.2876, 0.3526 and 0.3567 in the context of
Tobin’s Q for the US, Brazil, Russia, India,
China and Indonesia, respectively. Mean-
while, the estimated coefficient values of
corporate governance (
6
GOV
it
) are 0.5105,
0.2865, 0.2874, 0.2927, 0.3371 and 0.2949
in the context of  ROA in the US, Brazil, Rus-
sia, India, China and Indonesia, respectively.
The results use the interactive term
(
7
Train*GOV
it
) indicating that different lev-
els of corporate governance may result with
the different impacts of  TDP on the firms’
performance. The research’s explanation
starts with the US firms, where the interac-
tive term is positive and significant. The es-
timated coefficient values are 0.2530 and
0.2422 for Tobin’s Q and ROA, respectively.
Similar to the US context, firms in Brazil also
showed a significant association between the
interactive terms and the firms’ performance,
where the estimated coefficient values are
0.2432 and 0.2169 for Tobin’s Q and ROA,
respectively. This conclusion about the inter-
active terms and firms’ performance is also
found in Russia, India, China, and Indonesia,
with different magnitudes of the estimated
coefficient. In Russia, the association is esti-
mated with coefficient values of 0.2023
(Tobin’s Q model) and 0.1970 (ROA model).
Meanwhile, firms in India have the estimated
coefficient values of 0.1770 and 0.1980 for
Tobin’s Q and ROA, respectively. The esti-
mated coefficient values of the interactive
terms are 0.2095 (Tobin’s Q model) and
0.2158 (ROA model) in China. Lastly, Indo-
nesian firms’ performance is significantly in-
duced by the interactive terms with values
of  0.1486 (Tobin’s Q model) and 0.1400
(ROA model). In short, the interactive terms
of TDP and corporate governance have sig-
nificant influence on both firm performance,
Tobin’s Q and ROA, in the six countries over
a six year period.
Therefore, this research surmised that
there is a moderating role of corporate gov-
ernance on the relationship between TDP and
firm performance. The positive sign and in-
creasing R2 from the interactive terms indi-
cated the moderating role has a good effect
on the relationship. The changes of  the sign
of the baseline variables from negative to
positive or from not-significant to significant
implied another role for corporate governance
in the relationship. This means firms with
good corporate governance might manage
their TDP well and will have relatively bet-
ter performance compared to firms with poor
corporate governance. Another implication of
this research is that good corporate gover-
nance not only strengthens the TDP-firm
performance relationship, but may also use
training and development in a positive man-
ner by not having an inverse relationship be-
tween the size of  the firm and the firm’s
performance, or the firm’s growth and its
performance.
However, this conclusion cannot be
found in India and China, which makes this
research even more interesting. India and
China are two labor-intensive countries which
showed that TDP will not have any effect on
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the firms there. Firms in India and China will
see no effect; no matter how much these firms
spend on their employees’ training and de-
velopment or no matter how intense the in-
vestment of  the firms in training and devel-
opment is. Yet, firms with good corporate
governance may produce different results.
The significance of the sign of the interac-
tive terms indicates that firms in India and
China may put the reason for their firms’ per-
formance down to their TDP if  the firms have
good levels of corporate governance.
Robustness Test: Using a Dummy
Variable of Corporate
Governance
The results reported in the previous sec-
tion suggested that corporate governance may
influence TDP in obtaining good performance
among firms. So far, it has not been explicitly
controlled for good levels of corporate gov-
ernance. To the extent that good or bad cor-
porate governance may also affect the esti-
mated value of Model (4), this research in-
Table 5. Estimates of  Training and Development Policy, Corporate Governance, and
Firm Performance
 US Brazil 
 Tobin's Q ROA Tobin's Q ROA 
INTERCEPT 
0.9046*** 0.9050*** 0.8197*** 0.8754*** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0009) (0.0000) 
RLTA 
0.0465 0.0159 0.0172 0.0167 
(0.1655) (0.2128) (0.2133) (0.2979) 
ROIS 
0.0456*** 0.0441** 0.0473*** 0.0412*** 
(0.0008) (0.0236) (0.0021) (0.0075) 
RCES 
 0.9272***  0.9024** 0.2456 0.2540 
(0.0015) (0.0199) (0.1564) (0.3312) 
RLEV 
 0.5188*** 0.5165*** 0.2767** 0.3156*** 
(0.0000) (0.0021) (0.0317) (0.0440) 
TRAIN 
0.4223*** 0.4259*** 0.3583** 0.3827*** 
(0.0000) (0.0022) (0.0164) (0.0015) 
GOV 
0.5308*** 0.5105*** 0.3389*** 0.2865*** 
(0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0033) (0.0000) 
TRAIN*GOV 
0.2530*** 0.2422*** 0.2432*** 0.2169*** 
(0.0002) (0.0018) (0.0009) (0.0022) 
Adj R2 0.3006 0.2911 0.2459 0.2531 
 Russia India 
INTERCEPT 
0.7823*** 0.7065*** 0.7054*** 0.8468*** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
RLTA 
0.0497 0.0378 0.0261 0.0164 
(0.7469) (0.8884) (0.2140) (0.3417) 
ROIS 
0.0369*** 0.0440** 0.0395** 0.0483** 
(0.0021) (0.0119) (0.0125) (0.0137) 
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Table 5. Continued
The regression is performed using two different measures of  performance: Tobin’s Q and ROA. The figure stated are
the coefficient values, except numbers in parentheses which are p-value. The dependent variable is firm performance. The
control variables are relative size (RLTA), relative profitability (ROIS), relative growth (RCES), and relative leverage
(RLEV). The main independent variables are Training and Development Policy (TDP), and Corporate Governance. The
innovation in this research is the interactive terms between TDP and corporate governance as this research aims to
investigate the moderating role of corporate governance on the relationship between TDP and Firm performance. The
model is as follow: titititititititi GOVTrainGOVTrainLEVCESOISLTAValue ,,7,6,5,4,3,2,1 *  
 Russia India 
 Tobin's Q ROA Tobin's Q ROA 
RCES 
0.2615 0.2627 0.7430** 0.5425*** 
(0.1653) (0.3517) (0.0265) (0.0065) 
RLEV 
0.1772 0.1230 0.4368*** 0.3474*** 
(0.1073) (0.1363) (0.0017) (0.0019) 
TRAIN 
0.4014** 0.3979** 0.1779 0.1919 
(0.0101) (0.0360) (0.1437) (0.1012) 
GOV 
0.3391*** 0.2874*** 0.2876*** 0.2927*** 
(0.0056) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0060) 
TRAIN*GOV 
0.2023*** 0.1970*** 0.1770** 0.1980** 
(0.0006) (0.0037) (0.0144) (0.0145) 
Adj R2 0.2154 0.2166 0.2353 0.2093 
 China Indonesia 
INTERCEPT 
0.8197*** 0.7629*** 0.8739*** 0.7373*** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
RLTA 
0.0375 0.0312 0.0266 0.0184 
(0.2240) (0.3383) (0.3275) (0.2128) 
ROIS 
0.0383*** 0.0463*** 0.0448*** 0.0398*** 
(0.0028) (0.0030) (0.0032) (0.0078) 
RCES 
0.7458** 0.6440*** 0.7549** 0.5743*** 
(0.0279) (0.0177) (0.0292) (0.0069) 
RLEV 
0.4700*** 0.3418* 0.4166*** 0.3085* 
(0.0060) (0.0619) (0.0060) (0.0627) 
TRAIN 
0.1347 0.1506 0.2299** 0.2957* 
(0.1517) (0.2127) (0.0148) (0.0746) 
GOV 
0.3526*** 0.3371** 0.3567*** 0.2949** 
(0.0000) (0.0351) (0.0000) (0.0156) 
TRAIN*GOV 
0.2095*** 0.2158*** 0.1486*** 0.1400*** 
(0.0081) (0.0075) (0.0052) (0.0057) 
Adj R2 0.2496 0.2356 0.2235 0.2065 
79
Gadjah Mada International Journal of Business – January-April, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2018
vestigates further by establishing a dummy
variable for the level of corporate gover-
nance. Table 6 depicts different estimates of
Model (4) where the corporate governance
index is modified into a binary dummy vari-
able.
The dummy variable is created by us-
ing the following procedure. First, the mean
is taken after sorting out the governance in-
dex from the highest to the lowest in each
year, according to each country. Then, those
firms with a corporate governance index
higher than the average value are given 1 and
0 otherwise. The data set of the corporate
governance index is replaced by this new
dummy variable data. After that, it proceeded
by re-employing Model (4).
The results showed the indifferent con-
clusions except for the control variables. Prof-
itability and leverage contributed positively
and were statistically significant to the firms’
performance in all countries, including Bra-
zil and Russia. Meanwhile, India, China, and
Indonesia lost the growth effect on the firms’
performance. Size still does not have any sig-
nificant effect on the firms’ performance.
The interactive terms for new corporate
governance arrived at the same conclusion;
there is a moderating role by corporate gov-
ernance on the relationship between TDP and
the firms’ performance, as reported in Table
6.This study also found that within each
country, the role of  corporate governance
differed. Based on the estimated coefficient,
the moderating role of corporate governance
is significantly higher for US firms. Interest-
ingly, there are no consistent results between
Tobin’s Q and ROA when this research used
these new interactive terms. This research
believes this is due to the variance of the in-
dexation of  the corporate governance’s level,
or in other words, a statistical problem. An-
other issue that may arise in this research is
that there are no exact corporate governance
items that may enhance the TDP-firm per-
formance link. For instance, board structure
and compenzation policy may have different
impacts on the relationship. The researchers
leave this issue for future research.
Table 6. Robustness Test by Using Binary Variable of  Corporate Governance
  US Brazil 
 Tobin's Q ROA Tobin's Q ROA 
INTERCEPT 
2.1219*** 2.1487*** 1.9839*** 2.1027*** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
RLTA 
0.2956 0.2390 0.2124 0.1956 
(0.4690) (0.5884) (0.5851) (0.6549) 
ROIS 
0.1036*** 0.0895** 0.0887** 0.0413*** 
(0.0008) (0.0236) (0.0410) (0.0080) 
RCES 
0.7017*** 0.6913** 0.4683 0.2784 
(0.0015) (0.0199) (0.1906) (0.1704) 
RLEV 
0.5148*** 0.3879*** 0.4276** 0.2852** 
(0.0000) (0.0021) (0.0462) (0.0401) 
TRAIN 
0.5563*** 0.5628** 0.1868** 0.1967* 
(0.0008) (0.0225) (0.0434) (0.0534) 
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  US Brazil 
 Tobin's Q ROA Tobin's Q ROA 
GOV 
0.0558*** 0.0627*** 0.0120*** 0.0175*** 
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0000) 
TRAIN*GOV 
0.0734*** 0.0403*** 0.0474*** 0.0478*** 
(0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0000) 
Adj R2 0.1530 0.1244 0.0774 0.0922 
 Russia India 
INTERCEPT 
2.0397*** 1.8928*** 2.0047*** 1.7772*** 
(0.0000) (0.0020) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
RLTA 
0.2088 0.2083 0.1864 0.1808 
(0.7084) (0.7126) (0.5704) (0.6656) 
ROIS 
0.0175* 0.0511** 0.0704* 0.0701*** 
(0.0585) (0.0120) (0.0635) (0.0078) 
RCES 
0.1811 0.3107 0.5906 0.3175 
(0.1813) (0.1676) (0.1641) (0.1116) 
RLEV 
0.4804* 0.3329* 0.3966** 0.2868*** 
(0.0733) (0.0882) (0.0468) (0.0031) 
TRAIN 
0.2364** 0.2616** 0.1751 0.1824 
(0.0471) (0.0485) (0.1061) (0.1452) 
GOV 
0.0196*** 0.0331*** 0.0473*** 0.0496*** 
(0.0000) (0.0034) (0.0044) (0.0000) 
TRAIN*GOV 
0.0281*** 0.0187*** 0.0392** 0.0214*** 
(0.0071) (0.0000) (0.0169) (0.0000) 
Adj R2 0.0812 0.0655 0.0945 0.1009 
 China Indonesia 
INTERCEPT 
1.8752*** 1.7968*** 1.8948*** 1.9997*** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
RLTA 
0.2228 0.2035 0.1706 0.2344 
(0.5711) (0.6979) (0.5374) (0.5899) 
ROIS 
0.0931* 0.0390** 0.0920** 0.0193** 
(0.0684) (0.0366) (0.0125) (0.0109) 
RCES 
0.3211 0.2754 0.3462 0.3466 
(0.1476) (0.1106) (0.1629) (0.1082) 
RLEV 
0.3949** 0.3311*** 0.2687** 0.2589** 
(0.0478) (0.0044) (0.0329) (0.0104) 
Table 6. Continued
81
Gadjah Mada International Journal of Business – January-April, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2018
Results Discussion
This study revealed that a Training and
Development Policy (TDP) plays an impor-
tant role in firms’ performance, which is con-
sistent with previous empirical papers such
as those by Storey (2002), Storey (2004), and
Kwon and Rupp (2013). Even so, the role of
TDP on firm performance is not always true.
Particularly, this research discovered that the
significant effect of  TDP on firm performance
is very weak in India and China. Moreover,
the literature showed that a firm with good
corporate governance may have a better
policy-performance association (e.g. Shleifer
and Vishny 1997; Kwon and Rupp 2013).
Hence, this research continued to investigate
further by exploring the mediating role of
corporate governance on the TDP and firm
performance.
This research followed up on this un-
justified explanation by using a corporate
governance index. This index consisted of
four important dimensions namely, board
structure, board function, compenzation
policy, and shareholder rights. Of  course,
using this index does not explain which di-
mension, or dimensions, have an effect on
the relationship between TDP and firm per-
formance. But at least, this is the best data
available and also the best method to reduce
the excessive variance, which is a result of
having too many predictors, especially the
multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity, and
autocorrelation issues.
The results demonstrated interesting
findings, where corporate governance might
enhance the relationship between TDP and
firm performance. The negative signs of  the
variables in the TDP model are also chang-
ing to positive, and the magnitude of the es-
timated coefficient is bigger. India and China,
where TDP does not have an effect on firm
performance, showed an inverse relationship.
This implied that corporate governance rela-
tively fixes the firms’ performance through
imposing TDP.
 Tobin's Q ROA Tobin's Q ROA 
 China Indonesia 
TRAIN 
0.1262 0.1488 0.2330** 0.1062** 
(0.1613) (0.1655) (0.0408) (0.0420) 
GOV 
0.0351*** 0.0100*** 0.0710*** 0.0123*** 
(0.0000) (0.0060) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
TRAIN*GOV 
0.0322*** 0.0292*** 0.0308** 0.0344*** 
(0.0085) (0.0000) (0.0351) (0.0000) 
Adj R2 0.2446 0.1101 0.0824 0.0963 
Table 6. Continued
The regression is performed using two different measures of  performance: Tobin’s Q and ROA. The figure stated are
the coefficient values, except numbers in parentheses which are p-value. The dependent variable is firm performance. The
control variables are relative size (RLTA), relative profitability (ROIS), relative growth (RCES), and relative leverage
(RLEV). The main independent variables are Training and Development Policy (TDP), and Corporate Governance. The
innovation in this research is the interactive terms between TDP and corporate governance. This is robustness check of
the moderating role by creating a dummy variable of corporate governance. The model is as follow:
titititititititi GOVTrainGOVTrainLEVCESOISLTAValue ,,7,6,5,4,3,2,1 *  
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In other words, successful training and
development relies on the corporate gover-
nance of  the firms. Firms without good cor-
porate governance ended up with low growth
and probably also grow smaller. The substan-
tial outlay that organizations spend each year
on formal training and development programs
is made with the expectation that their train-
ing investments will lead to improvements in
their organizational performance, but this is
hugely based on the corporate governance
performance of  the firm. This is consistent
with studies by Bunch (2007), and Deng et
al. (2012), which addressed the success rate
of training and development and found it
depends on the governance of  the firm. Us-
ing Shleifer and Vishny (1997) to postulate
the conclusion, TDP, which is an investment
for better firm performance, will be success-
ful if  the firm has good corporate governance.
A better level of corporate governance might
prohibit the managers from personally prof-
iting from business operations such as train-
ing and development. This implied that firms
with good levels of corporate governance may
perform relatively better from their training
and development programmes as compared
to those firms without good levels of  corpo-
rate governance. Moreover, this research also
showed that without a good level of corpo-
rate governance, a firm might suffer from the
incurred cost of its training and development.
Besides that, training and development poli-
cies without good corporate governance may
reduce the size and growth of  firms, as can
be illustrated from cases in India and China.
Research Implications for
Companies
Does a Training and Development
Policy (TDP) affect firm performance? Indus-
try and policy makers may benefit in their
policymaking processes from the answer.
Often, training and development is treated
as cost center, hence, companies will ignore
it. The thought that trained staff will leave
the company after achieving better capabili-
ties pushes companies to have bad policies
regarding this matter. Yet, the results of  this
study show differently. They show that TDP
is important for firm performance, meaning
that TDP is a good investment for a com-
pany. Second, to ensure the return of  TDP
by improved performance, a company has to
have good corporate governance.
Hence, the findings from this research
have two main implications for companies.
First, it is empirically proven that employing
TDP in an organization is good for the per-
formance. This implies companies should
invest in their human resources, especially
training and development, to induce improved
performance. Second, there is a moderating
role by corporate governance on the TDP-
performance link, indicating the need for
good corporate governance to ensure the re-
turn from TDP. This implies that companies
should have better monitoring or governance
to make sure their TDP is working. In other
words, corporate governance is essential for
companies to obtain a good return from their
TDP outlays.
Conclusions
This research aims to investigate the role
of governance on the relationship between
TDP and firm performance. This research
constructed a panel data set with a large range
of  firms from countries such as Brazil, Rus-
sia, India, China, Indonesia, and the US over
the period from 2007 to 2013, and explored
how much of  the performance of  TDP ap-
pears to arise from the structure of  their cor-
porate governance. The baseline model con-
sists of profitability (operating income to
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sales), growth (capital expenditure to sales),
leverage (debt to equity), and size (natural
logarithm of  the total assets). Firm perfor-
mance is measured more comprehensively
than in prior studies in the area, where the
return on assets and Tobin’s Q are used. The
TDP is a dummy variable which is 1 if the
firm imposes TDP, and 0 otherwise. The cor-
porate governance is measured by a well-es-
tablished index called the corporate gover-
nance performance index. This index is more
robust than the exclusive ownership variables,
because it also includes board structure,
board function, compenzation policy, and
shareholder rights. Another reason for using
this index is to avoid the statistical issues if
there are too many independent variables,
such as type 1 or type 2 errors. As a robust-
ness test, corporate governance’s performance
is further clustered into the dummy variable
of good corporate governance and poor cor-
porate governance, and then re-run again in
the model by using this governance dummy
variable.
The results documented three interest-
ing findings. Once this research accounted for
the impact of  corporate governance on firm
value, the researchers found a positive and
significant relationship between corporate
governance and firm performance. This
means a company with good corporate gov-
ernance tends to have good performance.
This research continued by introducing only
TDP into the baseline mode. The research-
ers found that TDP contributed positively and
significantly to the firm performance, con-
firming the postulate of  the link between
TDP and performance. For example, firms
imposing TDP may have increased efficiency
at work, leading to better productivity by the
firms and better performance as compared
to firms without TDP. Interestingly, the
baseline model (profitability, growth, size, and
leverage) lost its contribution to performance
when this research introduced TDP into the
model. This indicated that imposing TDP in
a firm is more important than the financial
factor in relation to improving the firm’s per-
formance. Lastly, this research tested whether
corporate governance plays an important role
in the relationship between TDP and firm
performance. Using the corporate governance
index, this research found that there is a sig-
nificant effect by corporate governance on the
relationship between TDP and firm perfor-
mance. This research then continued to the
robustness test by using the governance
dummy variable and found the same results.
This means that TDP will influence a firm’s
performance if  it has good corporate gover-
nance. In a nutshell, this research concluded
that corporate governance plays an important
role in the relationship between TDP and
firm performance. This implies that firms
with TDP and good corporate governance
will outperform those firms with TDP but
poor corporate governance and firms with-
out TDP.
This research may sum up two theories:
the knowledge transfer theory and human
capital theory. This research explored the use
of the knowledge transfer theory in explain-
ing the relationship between TDP and firm
performance. According to this theory, when
trained employees transfer or share their
knowledge in their organization’s operations,
the organization will become more efficient
and effective which means they will have
human capital, which is important for ensur-
ing the success of  the firm’s performance.
This research’s findings confirmed it by show-
ing the positive and significant effects of TDP
on firm performance. Additionally, this re-
search enriches the human capital theory,
where it showed how increases in their hu-
man capital enabled firms to operate better.
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However, the findings need to be vali-
dated by further research, conducted in other
developed markets or emerging markets, in
order to verify some facts about certain com-
mon characteristics embedded in the devel-
oped markets or in the emerging markets. The
focus of this study has been to examine the
role of corporate governance on the relation-
ship of  TDP and firm performance. Based
on certain limitation, a few extensions can
be further built upon this analysis. Firstly,
more details of the training and development
investment by the firms may give different
insights. Secondly, corporate governance such
as the board’s structure, shareholder rights,
firm’s identity, or even compenzation policy
can give more insights into the TDP-firm
performance association. Lastly, this study is
limited to a full dimension of corporate gov-
ernance, where each type of governance may
have different effects on the relationship be-
tween TDP and performance. Future research
may develop a corporate governance dimen-
sion based on certain characteristics, and test
it to see what type of governance has a sig-
nificant effect on the links between TDP and
performance. Additionally, some of  the in-
ternal corporate governance’s attributes, such
as the roles of families and government-
linked companies’ directors can be another
interesting extension of  this study.
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